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THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE “HOME”: § 162(A)(2) AND WHY
MARRIED TAXPAYERS JUST CAN’T GET “AWAY”
ABSTRACT
This Comment examines § 162(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, which
allows a taxpayer to deduct expenses incurred while traveling “away from
home” for business purposes. Under this provision, a taxpayer may deduct
expenses for travel fares, meals, and lodging. Although such expenses would
seem to be non-deductible because they are personal in nature, Congress
created a limited exception under § 162(a)(2) to alleviate the burden on the
taxpayer whose job requires him to work away from home and therefore
essentially incur duplicate living expenses. On the face of the statute, the only
apparent requirement is that a taxpayer must be “away from home,” but the
statute’s simplicity is deceptive.
Taxpayers who wish to deduct travel expenses under § 162(a)(2) face
nearly a century of inconsistent interpretations and arbitrary limitations of
when a taxpayer is considered “away.” By analyzing a range of both cases
and characteristics of different taxpayers, this Comment reveals an additional
complication: the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and courts have created a
“marriage penalty” that severely limits the availability of the § 162(a)(2)
deduction for married taxpayers. This Comment further uncovers a gender
bias against married women in the application of the provision by the IRS and
courts. The gender makeup of the workforce has changed significantly since
§ 162(a)(2) first appeared in the Tax Code in 1921, and a revision is necessary
to alleviate the burden it imposes on working families.
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INTRODUCTION
Every presidential election, the public pressures the candidates to release
their income tax returns, and the 2008 election was no exception.1 While
serving as governor of Alaska, Sarah Palin worked out of both Juneau, the state
capital, and Wasilla, her hometown where she resides with her husband and
children.2 On her 2007 income tax return, Governor Palin claimed a $16,591
deduction under § 162(a)(2) for travel expenses she incurred while working out
of Wasilla.3 Under § 162(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, only expenses
incurred while “away from home” are deductible.4 A taxpayer unfamiliar with
§ 162(a)(2) might assume that Governor Palin could deduct the expenses
incurred in Juneau because only then was she truly away from her hometown
of Wasilla. However, the answer is not so simple.
If “home” is defined in the ordinary sense, then the governor could deduct
from her income any travel expenses incurred in Juneau because she would be
away from her home in Wasilla.5 However, if “home” is defined as the
taxpayer’s “principal place of business,” then Governor Palin would be unable
to deduct expenses incurred in Juneau because Juneau is her principal place of
business. By analyzing a range of “away from home” cases, this Comment
reveals an additional complication in attempting to answer the governor’s tax
dilemma: by severely limiting the availability of the § 162(a)(2) deduction, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and courts have created a “marriage penalty”
for married taxpayers.6 Unfortunately for Governor Palin, the bad news does

1 See James V. Grimaldi & Karl Vick, Palin Billed State for Nights Spent at Home, WASH. POST, Sept.
9, 2008, at A01 (describing expenditures Sarah Palin charged to the State of Alaska).
2 Id. When Palin stayed in Wasilla, she actually worked in nearby Anchorage. Id. (“Palin moved her
family to the capital during the legislative session last year, but prefers to stay in Wasilla and drive 45 miles to
Anchorage to a state office building.”).
3 Id. The controversy surrounding Palin’s taxes focused specifically on “per diem” payments she
received from Alaska. Id. Palin should only be able to omit these employer reimbursements from her gross
income if she could legitimately deduct these expenses under § 162(a)(2) of the Tax Code.
4 See 26 U.S.C. § 162(a)(2) (2006) (allowing a deduction for “traveling expenses (including amounts
expended for meals and lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the circumstances)
while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business”).
5 “Home” is defined as “one’s place of residence,” “a place of origin,” or “the social unit formed by a
family living together.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
UNABRIDGED 1082 (2002). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “home” as “dwelling place,” but then
differentiates between “family home” and “tax home.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 638, 750, 1502 (8th ed.
2004).
6 See infra Part II.
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not end here. This Comment further uncovers in the courts’ application of
§ 162(a)(2) a gender bias against earnings by married women.7
Generally, a taxpayer can deduct his business expenses but cannot deduct
any “personal, living, or family expenses.”8 Deducting business but not
personal expenses is permitted because “‘a person’s taxable income should not
include the cost of producing that income.’”9 Section 162(a)(2) allows a
taxpayer to deduct expenses for travel, meals, and lodging, although such
expenses appear to be non-deductible because they are personal in nature.10
Congress created a limited exception under § 162(a)(2) to alleviate the burden
on the taxpayer whose business requires him to work “away from home,” and
therefore essentially incur duplicative living expenses.11 Accordingly, some
living expenses are non-deductible because they are personal expenses, while
duplicative living expenses may be deductible under § 162(a)(2).12 As a result,
a taxpayer whose expenses qualify for the deduction under § 162(a)(2) has a

7

Id.
26 U.S.C. § 262(a) (2006).
9 See, e.g., Nathan R. Gerhardt, Internal Revenue Code § 162(a)(2): Where is “Home?,” 2002 FED. B.
ASS’N SEC. TAX’N REP. 2, 2 (quoting Hantzis v. Comm’r, 638 F.2d 248, 249 (1st Cir. 1981)).
10 IRS.gov, Topic 511 - Business Travel Expenses, http://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/tc511.html (last visited
Jan. 21, 2010). Under § 162(a)(2), a taxpayer can deduct:
8

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Travel by airplane, train, bus, or car between your home and your business destination . . . .
Using your car while at your business destination[.]
Fares for taxis or other types of transportation between the airport or train station and your
hotel, the hotel and the work location, and from one customer to another, or from one place
of business to another[.]
Meals and lodging[.]
Tips for services related to any of these expenses.
Dry cleaning and laundry.
Business calls while on your business trip . . . .
Other similar ordinary and necessary expenses related to your business travel. These
expenses might include transportation to and from a business meal, public stenographer’s
fees, computer rental fees, and operating and maintaining a house trailer.

Id. Travel expenses do not include everyday non-deductible commuting expenses between a taxpayer’s
residence and primary workplace. Mark E. Battersby, On the Road with Uncle Sam: Tax Deductions for
Traveling on Business, PA. LAW., Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 50.
11 Kroll v. Comm’r, 49 T.C. 557, 562 (1968) (“The purpose of the ‘away from home’ provision is to
mitigate the burden of the taxpayer who, because of the exigencies of his trade or business, must maintain two
places of abode and thereby incur additional and duplicate living expenses.”).
12 See James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1962) (arguing that since a taxpayer must eat
and sleep regardless of whether he is traveling, “that portion of the cost of food and lodging while on business
travel which would have been incurred even at [his place of residence] is actually a personal living expense”).

DIEHN GALLEYSFINAL

972

6/25/2010 10:08 AM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59

distinct advantage over a taxpayer whose expenses do not qualify for the
deduction.13
This Comment first examines the varying and often conflicting strains of
jurisprudence governing the interpretation of § 162(a)(2) and presents a
coherent analysis of what constitutes a taxpayer’s “home” and when a taxpayer
is considered “away.”14 After Congress adopted the provision in 1921, the
interpretation of this provision has been left to courts.15 This Comment
demonstrates that in the vast majority of cases, married taxpayers are unable to
obtain the benefit of the deduction because courts, by repeatedly restricting the
availability of § 162(a)(2) to married taxpayers, have created a marriage
penalty.16 This Comment asserts that the two primary victims of the
§ 162(a)(2) marriage penalty are dual wage earners and married women
because courts fail to consider the implications of their decisions on these
groups, thereby creating an additional disincentive for wives to enter and
remain in the workforce.17 The workforce has changed significantly since
§ 162(a)(2) first appeared in the Tax Code in 1921, and a revision is necessary
to alleviate the burden on working families imposed by the marriage penalty
and to facilitate the entry of more women into the workforce.
Part I of this Comment discusses the development of § 162(a)(2) case law
and demonstrates the increasing reluctance of courts to allow a taxpayer to
receive the deduction. Part II argues that courts have created a § 162(a)(2)
13 See id. at 207–08 (“This discriminates against taxpayers whose business does not require travel, and
who therefore pay tax upon all of the income which they devote to their personal living expenses. The
discrimination may be substantial . . . . [T]he resulting situation is no doubt inequitable.”); Kara Fratto, The
Taxation of Professional U.S. Athletes in Both the United States and Canada, 14 SPORTS LAW J. 29, 33 (2007)
(“Expenses for travel while away from home are an attractive deduction because they are an ‘above the line’
deduction from gross income to arrive at the adjusted gross income.” (emphasis added)).
14 See infra Part I.
15 See John A. Lynch, Jr., Travel Expense Deductions Under I.R.C. § 162(a)(2)—What Part of “Home”
Don’t You Understand?, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 705, 712 (2005) (noting that the legislative history surrounding
§ 162(a)(2) is “scant and ambiguous”).
16 See infra Part II. The inability of married taxpayers to obtain the deduction will be referred to as the
“marriage penalty” throughout this Comment. This term does not refer to the marriage penalty that already
exists in the Tax Code’s progressive rate structure and the married filing jointly status. See, e.g., Laura Ann
Davis, A Feminist Justification for the Adoption of an Individual Filing System, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 197, 199
(1988) (providing “a feminist justification for the use of a separate tax filing system” in part because the
progressive rate structure and the joint filing system discriminate against married women taxpayers); Edward
J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 983, 989 (1993) (“The most common complaints made in the tax policy and economic literature
regarding the biases of the income tax against women concern the system of aggregated spousal rates, or ‘joint
filing.’ The system has given rise to the ‘marriage penalty.’” (footnote omitted)).
17 See infra Part III.
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marriage penalty, which prevents married taxpayers from obtaining the
deduction. Part III argues that there are two primary victims of the marriage
penalty: (1) dual wage earners, and (2) married women taxpayers. Part IV
advocates for the enactment of a special provision reinterpreting § 162(a)(2)
for married couples who file jointly, whereby “home” is defined as a
taxpayer’s place of residence. Solving the problems created by the current
interpretation of § 162(a)(2) through a statutory amendment is neither drastic
nor unprecedented; the IRS and courts have made similar exceptions for
certain groups of taxpayers in the past.18
It is important to note that § 162(a)(2) also has created obstacles for groups
other than married and women taxpayers. However, such obstacles are based
on the occupation of the taxpayer and do not trigger marital status and gender
concerns.19 This Comment addresses the situation of these other taxpayers
briefly in Part IV but focuses on the need for a legislative solution for married
women taxpayers.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF § 162(A)(2) “AWAY FROM HOME” JURISPRUDENCE
Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code allows a taxpayer to deduct
“all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business.”20 Under § 162(a)(2) these expenses
include “traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and
lodging other than amounts which are lavish or extravagant under the
circumstances) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business.”21
On its face, the statute has only two requirements: (1) the taxpayer must be
“away from home;” and (2) the taxpayer must be “in the pursuit of a trade or
business.” Therefore, it would appear that Governor Palin could deduct
expenses she incurred in Juneau because she was working away from her
hometown of Wasilla. However, the question of whether an expense is
deductible under § 162(a)(2) has been “a prolific and continuous source of
18

See infra Part IV.
E.g., York v. Comm’r, 160 F.2d 385, 385 (1st Cir. 1947) (taxpayer is a lawyer); Wallace v. Comm’r,
144 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1944) (taxpayer is an actress); Johnson v. Comm’r, 115 T.C. 210, 211 (2000)
(taxpayer is a ship captain); Horton v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 589, 589 (1986) (taxpayer is a professional athlete);
see also Deblock v. Dep’t of Revenue, 7 Or. Tax 191, 192 (Or. T.C. 1977) (“‘The question has arisen in
practically as many contexts as there are occupations in the vast and varied economy of the country.’” (quoting
the plaintiffs’ trial memorandum)).
20 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2006).
21 Id. § 162(a)(2). See also IRS.gov, supra note 10 (providing examples of deductible travel expenses
while away from home).
19
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litigation under the income tax law.”22 At the heart of the controversy is what
constitutes a taxpayer’s “home” for purposes of § 162(a)(2).23
Because neither the Tax Code nor the Supreme Court provides a definition
of the word “home,” the IRS and lower courts have interpreted the term
inconsistently.24 A shrinking minority of courts define “home” in this context
as the taxpayer’s “place of residence.”25 On the other hand, the IRS and the
Tax Court have adopted the position that a taxpayer’s “home” is his “principal
place of business.”26 Although the Supreme Court has addressed § 162(a)(2)
on three different occasions, it has failed to offer clear guidance on the
interpretation of “home.”27 This section explains and distinguishes the
minority rule, the majority rule, and the Supreme Court’s position.
A. “Home” Means Home
The ordinary meaning of the word “home” is one’s “place of residence.”28
Such an interpretation does not appear to conflict with the purpose of the
deduction, which is to avoid taxing people whose business requires them to
travel away from home and thus incur duplicative living expenses.29 If
Congress had intended for “home” to mean something unusual, it could have
used a “more appropriate term.”30 In the dissent to Commissioner v. Flowers,
22

Deblock, 7 Or. Tax at 192.
E.g., Crystal Ovsak, The Not So Slippery Slope: The Eighth Circuit Determines That Employer-Paid
Airfare Is Not “Wages” Subject to Withholding Taxes, 77 N.D. L. REV. 433, 438–41 (2001) (discussing the
split of authority in defining “home” as either place of residence or principal place of business).
24 Compare Wallace v. Comm’r, 144 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1944) (defining home as taxpayer’s place of
residence), and Coburn v. Comm’r, 138 F.2d 763, 764 (2d Cir. 1943) (same), with Hantzis v. Comm’r, 638
F.2d 248, 254 (1st Cir. 1981) (defining home as taxpayer’s principal place of business), and Bixler v. Comm’r,
5 B.T.A. 1181, 1184 (1927) (same).
25 See infra Part I.A.
26 See infra Part I.B. Some courts use different terms to describe a taxpayer’s principal place of business.
E.g., Hantzis, 638 F.2d at 249 (defining home as a taxpayer’s “place of employment”); Filler v. Comm’r, 321
F.2d 900, 900 (8th Cir. 1963) (defining home as a taxpayer’s “principal post of duty”).
27 See infra Part I.C.
28 See supra note 5. Courts sometimes use the term “abode” to describe a taxpayer’s personal residence.
See, e.g., Henderson v. Comm’r, 143 F.3d 497, 499 (9th Cir. 1998).
29 See, e.g., Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding that a taxpayer with
no permanent residence cannot obtain the § 162(a)(2) deduction).
30 Wallace v. Comm’r, 144 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1944). The court further explained:
23

The plain, obvious and rational meaning of a tax statute is always to be preferred to any narrow
or hidden sense . . . and while the meaning to be given to terms used will be determined from the
character of their use by the legislature in the statute under consideration, words in common use
should not be distorted by administrative or judicial interpretation.
Id.

DIEHN GALLEYSFINAL

2010]

6/25/2010 10:08 AM

THERE’S NO PLACE LIKE “HOME”

975

Justice Rutledge rejected the notion of “home” as the taxpayer’s principal
place of employment because he could find “no purpose stated or implied in
the Act, the regulations or the legislative history to support such a distortion.”31
According to Justice Rutledge, the only stated purpose of § 162(a)(2) is to
relieve the tax burden when a taxpayer is away from home on business.32
Therefore, a taxpayer who is away from her place of residence, like Governor
Palin, should be able to deduct those costs incurred in the pursuit of business.
Today, however, for purposes of § 162(a)(2) only a minority of courts
define “home” as a taxpayer’s residence. In Coburn v. Commissioner, the
Second Circuit found that the taxpayer’s “home” was his home in the
“ordinary meaning of the word.”33 In Coburn, the taxpayer maintained a
residence in New York, but spent 263 days of the taxable year in California
pursuing an acting career.34 Although he engaged in some business-related
activities in New York, the taxpayer derived the majority of his income from
his work in California, where he had rented an apartment and employed a cook
and chauffeur.35 The Tax Court denied him the deduction of these expenses
under § 162(a)(2) based on a finding that his principal place of business was in
California.36 The Second Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s decision,37
reasoning that the travel expenses were deductible because “nothing in the
statute bears evidence of any unusual meaning” and “[t]he fact that by chance
he got five short-term contracts which caused him to spend 263 days in
California did not wrest him from New York City permanently even in a
professional sense.”38
Similarly, in Wallace v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit defined “home”
as the taxpayer’s place of residence, which allowed a taxpayer to take the
§ 162(a)(2) deduction.39 The taxpayer, an actress, worked for seven months in
Hollywood, California, during the taxable year but maintained her residence in
31 326 U.S. 465, 477 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the court of appeals that “if
Congress had meant ‘business headquarters,’ and not ‘home,’ it would have said ‘business headquarters’” and
stating that “[w]hen it used ‘home’ instead, I think it meant home in everyday parlance, not in some twisted
special meaning of ‘tax home’ or ‘tax headquarters.’”).
32 Id. at 474–75.
33 138 F.2d 763, 764 (2d Cir. 1943).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. The court noted that a tax “home” should be limited to a place where the taxpayer is “regularly
employed or customarily carries on business.” Id. (emphasis added).
38 Id. at 764–65.
39 144 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1944).
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San Francisco.40 Under § 162(a)(2), the taxpayer deducted the costs she
incurred working in Hollywood, including her rent and food expenses.41 In
allowing the deduction, the Ninth Circuit considered the particular situation of
the taxpayer: Her connections to Hollywood were only “casual, professional
and temporary . . . . Her physical presence and her place of abode in the
vicinity of Hollywood were business necessities, and at no time did she
manifest any intention or desire to remain there after completion of her
work.”42 Like the taxpayer in Coburn, the actress would not have been able to
deduct her business expenses under the “principal place of business”
definition.
B. “Home” as Principal Place of Business
In contrast to the opinions cited above, the IRS, the Tax Court, and the
majority of United States circuit courts have adopted the position that a
taxpayer’s “home” is generally his “principal place of business.”43 The courts
have justified this interpretation because the average taxpayer maintains a
home close to his place of employment.44 Under such an interpretation, a
taxpayer who maintains his place of residence somewhere other than his
principal place of business is unable to receive the deduction.
One of the earliest cases in which the Tax Court adopted the principal place
of business rule is Bixler v. Commissioner.45 In Bixler, the taxpayer
maintained a residence in Mobile, Alabama, with his family and was employed
by state fairs and expositions throughout the country.46 In 1922, he worked in
Hammond, Louisiana, from January until April, and at a fair in Houston,

40

Id. at 408.
Id. at 408–09.
42 Id. at 410–11.
43 Rev. Rul. 63-82, 1963-1 C.B. 33. An exception to this general rule is that when a taxpayer has no
regular principal place of business he can deduct § 162(a)(2) expenses under the place of residence definition;
however, if he cannot establish a regular place of residence, the taxpayer is deemed “homeless” and is unable
to deduct any expenses. See, e.g., Henderson v. Comm’r, 143 F.3d 497, 499–500 (9th Cir. 1998) (recognizing
exception but disallowing deduction because taxpayer did not incur continuous and substantial costs at his
place of residence and had no business reason to maintain it); Whitman v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 845, 850
(W.D. La. 1965) (recognizing exception but disallowing deduction because taxpayer’s home “in a real and
substantial sense” was his mobile home at each job site).
44 See Bixler v. Comm’r, 5 B.T.A. 1181, 1184 (1927) (“A taxpayer may not keep his place of residence
at a point where he is not engaged . . . and take a deduction from gross income for his living expenses while
away from home.”).
45 Id. at 1184.
46 Id. at 1182.
41
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Texas, from April through early December.47 The taxpayer then returned to
Mobile, where his family had remained, to work at a fair for all of 1923.48 The
court prohibited the taxpayer from deducting the living expenses he incurred in
Hammond and Houston in 1922 because it defined the taxpayer’s “home” for
purposes of § 162(a)(2) as his principal place of business.49 Under this rule,
the taxpayer’s “home” was Hammond while he worked in Hammond and
became Houston when worked in Houston.50 Accordingly, he could not deduct
expenses for either location because at the time he was not considered “away
from home.”51 The court offered little explanation for this interpretation of
“home,” stating only that “we think [§ 162(a)(2) was] intended to allow a
taxpayer a deduction of traveling expenses while away from his post of duty or
place of employment on duties connected with his employment.”52
C. The Supreme Court’s Position
The Supreme Court has declined to define “home” for purposes of
§ 162(a)(2), despite multiple opportunities to do so.53 The Supreme Court first
addressed § 162(a)(2) in Commissioner v. Flowers, where the taxpayer lived in
Jackson, Mississippi, but traveled to his office in Mobile, Alabama, for work.54
The Court held that the taxpayer could not deduct the transportation costs from
Jackson to Mobile, or the meal and lodging expenses he incurred while
working in Mobile.55 The Court established three requirements that must be
met for a taxpayer to deduct travel expenses under § 162(a)(2):
1.

47

The expense must be a reasonable and necessary traveling
expense, as that term is generally understood. This includes

Id.
Id. at 1183.
49 Id. at 1184 (“[T]raveling and living expenses are deductible under the provisions of this section only
while the taxpayer is away from his place of business, employment, or the post or station at which he is
employed, in the prosecution, conduct, and carrying on of a trade or business.”).
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. (emphasis added).
53 See Comm’r v. Stidger, 386 U.S. 287, 292 (1967) (deciding that it was “not necessary for us to decide
here whether this congressional action (or inaction) constitutes approval and adoption of the Commissioner’s
interpretation of ‘home’”); Peurifoy v. Comm’r, 358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958) (finding it was “inappropriate to
consider such questions”); Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 472 (1946) (finding it was “unnecessary here to
enter into or to decide this conflict”).
54 Flowers, 326 U.S. at 468. For the first year at issue, the taxpayer spent 203 days in Jackson and 66
days in Mobile and made 33 trips between the two locations. For the second year at issue, the taxpayer spent
168 days in Jackson and 102 days in Mobile and made 40 total trips. Id.
55 Id. at 473.
48
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such items as transportation fares and food and lodging expenses
incurred while traveling.
The expense must be incurred “while away from home.”
56
The expense must be incurred in pursuit of business.

The Court then found that the third requirement had not been met because
the expenses were not incurred in pursuit of the employer’s business, but rather
for “personal” reasons—the taxpayer’s desire to reside in Mississippi but work
in Alabama.57 Therefore, his travel expenses were not deductible.58 By
focusing on the third requirement, the Supreme Court avoided the task of
interpreting “home” for the purposes of § 162(a)(2).59
In his dissent, Justice Rutledge declined to adopt the test set out by the
majority, arguing that he would have allowed the deduction under § 162(a)(2)
because a taxpayer’s “home” is his place of residence.60 Therefore, under
Justice Rutledge’s model, the taxpayer’s “home” was in Jackson and the
transportation, lodging, and food expenses he incurred in Mobile would be
deductible.61 Like the court in Wallace, Justice Rutledge emphasized the
taxpayer’s strong connection to his place of residence62: Over the course of
thirty years, the taxpayer had worked and lived, paid local and state taxes, sent
his kids to school, owned a home, and established a law firm all in Jackson.63
In comparison, the taxpayer worked in Mobile for only one-third of the year
and spent the remainder of the year in Jackson.64 Although the taxpayer’s
decision to work in Mobile was “motivated chiefly by . . . personal
considerations,” he still did much of his work in Jackson.65 Therefore, Justice
Rutledge would have allowed the deduction, deemphasizing the taxpayer’s
motivation for working in one city and residing in another.

56

Id. at 470.
Id. at 472–73. The Court noted that if the taxpayer had lived and worked in one city, his living
expenses and commuting expenses would not be deductible; the nature of the expense did not change simply
because the taxpayer had moved farther away. Id. at 473.
58 Id. at 472–73.
59 Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 2–3. However, it appears that the taxpayer would have lost under either
definition of “home” using the Flowers test because the taxpayer would still fail to meet the third requirement.
JOEL S. NEWMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS 327–28 (3d ed. 2005).
60 Flowers, 326 U.S. at 474–75 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 475.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
57
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In United States v. Correll, the Court again dodged the issue of defining a
taxpayer’s “home” and instead more narrowly interpreted “away from home”
to require an overnight stay.66 The taxpayer was a traveling salesman who
“customarily left home early in the morning, ate breakfast and lunch on the
road, and returned home in time for dinner.”67 He deducted the cost of his
morning and noon meals on his income tax returns for 1960 and 1961 under
§ 162(a)(2).68 The Commissioner argued that the cost of the meals was a nondeductible personal expense because the taxpayer’s trips “requir[ed] neither
sleep nor rest, regardless of how many cities a given trip may have touched,
how many miles it may have covered, or how many hours it may have
consumed.”69 Although the Sixth Circuit had rejected the rule as an invalid
regulation, the Supreme Court deferred to the Commissioner and adopted the
“sleep or rest” requirement, which prohibits deductions of expenses under
§ 162(a)(2) for day trips.70 It reasoned that although arbitrary, the rule
simplified the enforcement of § 162(a)(2).71 In his dissent, Justice Douglas
agreed with the Sixth Circuit and rejected the majority’s adoption of the
overnight requirement.72 He argued that the rule was inappropriate because it
injected a time element into the provision in “‘an era of supersonic travel.’”73
In Peurifoy v. Commissioner,74 the Supreme Court again refrained from
defining “home” for purposes of § 162(a)(2) but created an exception to the
Flowers “personal-versus-business” distinction. In Peurifoy, the taxpayers
were three construction workers employed in Kinston, North Carolina, for
continuous periods of 8 1/2 months, 12 1/2 months, and 20 1/2 months,
respectively.75 Each taxpayer maintained a permanent residence in another
part of the state and wanted to deduct the expenses incurred for board and
lodging while working in Kinston.76 Following the reasoning in Flowers, the
Court found that the construction workers’ expenses were incurred because of
a personal choice not to live and work in the same place.77 Under the general
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77

389 U.S. 299 (1967).
Id. at 300.
Id.
Id. at 302–03.
Id. at 303, 307.
Id. at 303−04.
Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Correll v. United States, 369 F.2d 87, 89−90 (6th Cir. 1966)).
358 U.S. 59 (1958).
Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 60.
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rule of Flowers, a taxpayer cannot take advantage of § 162(a)(2) if the
expenses are not required “by the exigencies of business.”78 The Court in
Peurifoy did however adopt the Tax Court’s exception to the general rule:
when a taxpayer’s employment is temporary, expenses may be deductible
under § 162(a)(2) even though they are not required “by the exigencies of
business.”79 Stated another way, taxpayers do not need a business reason for
maintaining their place of residence, as long as their job away from home is
temporary. While the exception appears to help taxpayers like those in
Peurifoy—two of whom were away from home for less than a year—the Court
found that the employment terms for all three taxpayers were not temporary
and therefore the expenses were non-deductible.80 Once again, the Court failed
to address the definition of “home,” and instead decided the case on a “narrow
question of fact.”81
As demonstrated above, courts have struggled to arrive at reasonable and
coherent rules to apply § 162(a)(2) to address the complexities of everyday life
for taxpayers who may not live where they work. Justice Rutledge accurately
characterized the courts’ decisions in this way:
By construing “home” as “business headquarters”; by reading
“temporarily” as “very temporarily” into [§ 162(a)(2)]; by bringing
down “ordinary and necessary” from its first sentence into its second;
by finding inequity where Congress has said none exists; by
construing “commuter” to cover long-distance, irregular travel; and
by conjuring from the “statutory setting” a meaning at odds with the
plain wording of the clause, the Government makes over
82
understandable ordinary English into highly technical tax jargon.

Moreover, courts have yet to grapple with the implications of their
interpretations of the Tax Code on married couples or to address the resulting
gender bias. Parts II and III of this Comment describe these problems and
outline the argument for reform.

78

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 60–61. However, if a taxpayer’s employment was “indefinite” or “indeterminate,” expenses are
not deductible under § 162(a)(2). Id.
80 Id. at 61.
81 Id. at 60; see also supra note 53.
82 Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 479–80 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
79
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II. THE § 162(A)(2) “MARRIAGE PENALTY”
In allowing taxpayers to deduct lodging, meal, and travel expenses under
§ 162(a)(2), “Congress freed from taxation income spent on personal living
expenses while on business trips.”83 The taxpayer who qualifies for the
deduction receives a distinct advantage because he may deduct otherwise
personal living expenses and thereby lower his tax liability.84 Unfortunately,
in the vast majority of cases, married taxpayers are unable to obtain the
§ 162(a)(2) deduction.85 This section argues that courts have created a
§ 162(a)(2) marriage penalty by imposing four restrictions that target married
taxpayers: (1) the principal place of business rule, (2) the overnight
requirement, (3) the limitations to the temporary exception, and (4) the
personal-versus-business distinction.86 While single taxpayers are also limited
in their ability to deduct § 162(a)(2) expenses, married taxpayers are
disproportionately affected by these limitations because of their social and
economic realities.87
A. How the “Principal Place of Business” Rule Is Particularly Harmful to
Married Taxpayers
The majority of courts have defined “home” for the purposes of § 162(a)(2)
as a taxpayer’s principal place of business.88 By adopting a definition of
“home” that is inconsistent with its ordinary meaning, courts took their first big
step in limiting the § 162(a)(2) deduction for married taxpayers, albeit perhaps
83 James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 206–07 (9th Cir. 1962); see also Griesemer v. Comm’r, 10
B.T.A. 386, 389 (1928) (“Simply because the amounts in question happen to be ‘living’ expenses in a strict
sense does not prevent them from being deductible. . . .”).
84 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 301–02 (1967) (noting that a taxpayer who receives a deduction
for personal living expenses while on business travel receives “something of a windfall”); James, 308 F.2d at
207 (noting that the “discrimination may be substantial” when one taxpayer is allowed the deduction and
another taxpayer is not); see also supra note 10.
85 This Comment examines § 162(a)(2) cases from 1927 through 2008, specifically decisions where (1)
the taxpayer is the husband and primary wage earner and his wife is the secondary wage earner; (2) the
taxpayer is the wife and primary wage earner and her husband is the secondary wage earner; (3) the taxpayer is
the husband and it is unclear whether he is the primary wage earner; (4) the taxpayer is a single male; and (5)
the taxpayer is a single female. Taxpayers who are considered itinerant or “homeless” are outside the scope of
this survey.
86 See infra Part I.A–D.
87 See Davis, supra note 16, at 216–18 (noting that the “social and economic reality” that is the
traditional justification for joint filing for married couples in part no longer exists); Lynch, supra note 15, at
772–77 (discussing the application of the “tax home doctrine to deny deduction of business related living
expenses . . . of married couples where the spouses work in different places”).
88 See supra Part I.B–C.
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unintentionally. Recall the taxpayer in Bixler who maintained a family
residence in Mobile, Alabama, but worked at state fairs and expositions
throughout the country.89 The court denied the taxpayer the deduction when he
was traveling away from Mobile because it determined his tax home was his
principal place of business, making “home” wherever the job took him.90 To
avoid duplicative living expenses, the taxpayer would have had to relocate his
family from Mobile to Hammond in early-1922, from Hammond to Houston in
mid-1922, and then from Houston back to Mobile in late-1922.91 In the
alternative, the taxpayer could maintain his place of residence by quitting his
job and risking unemployment.
Bixler demonstrates that the majority approach “assumes that an employee
will locate the employee’s residence as close as possible to his or her
workplace” and is able to avoid the cost of maintaining two homes, one at his
principal place of business and one at his place of residence.92 The principal
place of business definition disadvantages married taxpayers because such
couples are less likely to relocate and significantly more likely to travel for
business purposes than their single counterparts.93 In comparison to single
taxpayers, married taxpayers tend to form stronger ties to communities and are
therefore less willing to move.94 This is especially true in the case of married
taxpayers with young children.95 Additionally, married couples, who account
for seventy-seven percent of all homeowners,96 are often more reluctant to
relocate because they are more likely to already own a home that they must

89

See supra text accompanying notes 45−52.
Id.
91 See Bixler v. Comm’r, 5 B.T.A. 1181 (1927) (failing to address the fact that the taxpayer’s family was
in Mobile and that the taxpayer returned there for work in 1923).
92 See Ovsak, supra note 23, at 440 (describing problems with the “principal place of business” rule).
93 See Evelyn Addante, Air Travel Market Segments: A New England Case Study, E-C026 TRANSP. RES.
CIRCULAR 307, 309−11, 318 (2001), available at http://onlinepubs.trb.org/Onlinepubs/circulars/ec026/ec026.
pdf (finding that “[m]en from family households who are traveling on business account for almost one-third of
the resident-based air travel market from New England;” whereas business trips by women from a family
household “account[] for 18 percent of commercial air trips” in the New England region).
94 See Sam Gould & Larry E. Penley, A Study of the Correlates of the Willingness to Relocate, 28 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 472, 472–73 (1985) (finding that length of age, job involvement, and time in area were negatively
associated with the willingness to relocate).
95 Id. at 473; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2009, at
1 tbl.C3 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html (finding that
66.8% of children under the age of eighteen live with both married parents).
96 Tom Van Riper, The Cost of Being Married Versus Being Single, FORBES.COM, July 25, 2006,
http://www.forbes.com/2006/07/25/singles-marriage-money-cx_tvr_06singles_0725costs.html.
90
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then sell before moving.97 Despite sometimes acknowledging the inequities
that flow from this rule, courts have for the most part adopted a rule where the
taxpayer’s principal place of business is considered “home” and as a result
consistently denied the deductions for married couples.98
B. The “Overnight Requirement” Substantially Limits the Benefits of
§ 162(a)(2) for Married Taxpayers
The Supreme Court has added a requirement that a taxpayer must be away
from home overnight to receive the § 162(a)(2) deduction.99 In Correll, the
taxpayer was a traveling salesman who left his place of residence early in the
morning for work and returned in time for dinner with his family,100 and he
was denied the deduction because the taxpayer had not been away overnight.101
After Correll, a taxpayer is unable to deduct § 162(a)(2) expenses if he returns
home at night, regardless of how far he travels each day. However, the
taxpayer who travels the same distance but spends the night in a hotel can
deduct personal expenses under § 162(a)(2).102
Married taxpayers are particularly affected by this limitation because they
are more likely to make daily long distance commutes than single taxpayers.103
While a single taxpayer tends to be freer to travel overnight, a married
taxpayer will often increase his daily commute to return home to his family at

97 See Andrew Oswald, Theory of Homes and Jobs 1 (Sept. 18, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (finding that homeowners in Britain are less likely to move to find a new job and that
homeownership therefore can lead to higher unemployment rates).
98 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 475 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (noting that the
taxpayer had worked in Jackson for thirty years, paid taxes and voted, sent his children to school, owned a
house that he had built, and established a law firm).
99 United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 304−05 (1967).
100 Id. at 300.
101 Id. at 302–07.
102 Although the taxpayer who returns to his place of residence on a daily basis does not incur additional
lodging expenses, he incurs the same meal and commuting costs as the taxpayer who spends the night in a
hotel. However, the taxpayer who returns to his place of residence on a daily basis is unable to deduct such
costs. See James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 206–07 (9th Cir. 1962). For an explanation of the difference
between non-deductible commuting expenses and § 162(a)(2) travel expenses, see Tsilly Dagan, Commuting,
26 VA. TAX REV. 185, 190–92 (2006).
103 See Heather Hofmeister & Detlev Lueck, Who Works Where, and How Does That Affect Family Life?
The Impact of Work Location on Family Outcomes in Germany and the United States 9 (unpublished
manuscript presented at the 2007 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in New York, New
York) (on file with author) (“Married men’s commutes are longer than single men’s commutes even when
income is the same, which suggests that the long commute of married men implies a choice to commute longer
in exchange for better residential options, perhaps as a family lifestyle strategy.”).
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night and help out with household tasks.104 The overnight requirement makes
it more difficult for families to spend time together because it creates a strong
financial incentive for a taxpayer to stay away from his place of residence
overnight.105 Furthermore, the overnight requirement is inappropriate because
it injects a time element into a provision that is primarily concerned with
geography, i.e., where the taxpayer is.106 Modern transportation provides an
efficient means of traveling long distances in a short amount of time—a
taxpayer can fly across the country in the morning, attend a business meeting,
and return in time for dinner with his family.107 A married taxpayer is more
likely to take advantage of such an option but then is unable to deduct
§ 162(a)(2) expenses because of the overnight requirement. The Court in
Correll acknowledged that the overnight requirement was an arbitrary rule, but
ignored the plight of married taxpayers in the interests of simplifying the
administration of § 162(a)(2).108
C. The “Temporary” Exception Is Unrealistic for Families in Today’s
Economy
In Peurifoy, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the principal
place of business rule when a taxpayer’s employment is “temporary,” because
it is unreasonable to expect a taxpayer to uproot his family for a job that is
neither permanent nor long-term.109 However, the majority of married couples
cannot take advantage of this exception because of the “business reason” rule
created by the First Circuit in Hantzis v. Commissioner and the one-year
limitation imposed by the statute.
In Hantzis, the First Circuit limited the temporary exception to situations
where the taxpayer had a business reason for maintaining his place of
residence away from his place of business.110 In Hantzis, the taxpayer resided
in Boston, Massachusetts, with her husband.111 She attended Harvard Law
104

Id.
See Correll, 389 U.S. at 299 (denying § 162(a)(2) deductions to a taxpayer who attempted to return
daily to his place of residence).
106 Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
107 See Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 1 (“The advent of very efficient means of public transportation allows
businessmen to travel great distances as part of their normal business operations.”).
108 See Correll, 389 U.S at 303 (“Any rule in this area must make some rather arbitrary
distinctions . . . .”).
109 Andrews v. Comm’r, 931 F.2d 132, 137 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing Peurifoy v. Comm’r, 358 U.S. 59
(1958)).
110 Hantzis v. Comm’r, 638 F.2d 248 (1st Cir. 1981).
111 Id. at 249.
105
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School, and her husband was employed as a faculty member at Northeastern
University.112 During her second year of law school, she unsuccessfully tried
to obtain employment in Boston for the following summer.113 Instead, she
worked for ten weeks as a legal assistant in New York City, while her husband
taught summer classes in Boston and remained in their family residence.114
She returned to their shared home in Boston after only ten weeks.115 After
acknowledging the temporary exception, the court found her “tax home” was
New York City because she had no business reason to maintain her residence
in Boston, and therefore disallowed the deduction.116
Although a majority of courts have adopted the First Circuit’s reasoning, 117
the Hantzis decision is unrealistic for married couples. A spouse, like the
taxpayer in Hantzis, will generally first search for job opportunities close to
home before considering to work farther away.118 Regardless of how
temporary the position might be, if a taxpayer is forced to work away from
home, he will not be able to deduct expenses if he lacks a “business
connection” to his place of residence.119 While a taxpayer’s willingness to be
geographically mobile gives him more job flexibility and reduces his potential
for unemployment, a taxpayer should not have to move his family each time a
new opportunity arises just to save duplicative living expenses.120 This is
especially true when the length of employment is uncertain and the taxpayer
soon may change jobs again.121

112

Id.
Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 255–56
117 E.g., Wilbert v. Comm’r, 553 F.3d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 2009); Henderson v. Comm’r, 143 F.3d 497,
499–500 (9th Cir. 1998); Andrews v. Comm’r, 931 F.2d 132, 136–37 (1st Cir. 1991); Yeates v. Comm’r, 873
F.2d 1159, 1160−61 (8th Cir. 1989); Koepke v. Comm’r, No. 21111-05S, 2008 WL 5100850, at *4 (T.C. Dec.
4, 2008).
118 See Hantzis, 638 F.2d at 249, 255 (describing how taxpayer first attempted to obtain a job in Boston
near her place of residence but failed and had to look in other cities); Yeates, 873 F.2d at 1160 (describing
taxpayer who repeatedly tried to find a job near his place of residence).
119 Hantzis, 638 F.2d at 249, 255 (describing taxpayer who was only away from her residence for one
summer).
120 See Michael Luo, For Growing Ranks of the White-Collar Jobless, Support with a Touch of the Spur,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, at A16 (describing the plight of an unemployed former manager who drove seven
hours to another city for a job fair because his family’s savings were rapidly dwindling).
121 See Koepke, 2008 WL 5100850, at *3–4 (denying the deduction although “[t]he reality of petitioner’s
situation was that he did not know how long he would be in any of the cities in which he worked or where he
would go next”).
113
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The Hantzis decision is particularly harmful to families when one spouse
becomes unemployed.122 Unemployment rates have soared recently and
taxpayers have struggled to find job opportunities.123 The average working
taxpayer may have to accept whatever position is available, regardless of
whether the job has long-term potential.124 For example, in Wilbert v.
Commissioner, a married taxpayer was laid off from his job in Minneapolis
and found temporary employment in three different cities throughout the
year.125 While working, the taxpayer maintained his family residence in
Minneapolis where his wife and children remained.126 Applying Hantzis, the
court denied him the benefit of the deduction because he no longer had a
“business reason” for maintaining his place of residence in Minneapolis.127
Unfortunately and not surprisingly, the couple in Wilbert is not alone—
many married taxpayers find themselves in similar economic positions and are
denied the deduction based on the Hantzis holding.128 The decision in Hantzis
destroys the one exception that still allowed married taxpayers to deduct
duplicative travel expenses. The “business reason” rule is unreasonable,
unrealistic, and inequitable in expecting the married taxpayer to relocate each
time one spouse finds new work, regardless of financial ability.129

122 See, e.g., Wilbert, 553 F.3d at 545–50 (explaining that a taxpayer lost his job near his place of
residence and was unable to receive the deduction when he could only find temporary work in bigger cities);
Bogue v. Comm’r, No. 24574-05, 2007 WL 1712639, at *4 (T.C. June 14, 2007) (same); Farran v. Comm’r,
No. 20434-05, 2007 WL 1712715, at *4 (T.C. June 14, 2007) (same); Riley v. Comm’r, No. 21124-05, 2007
WL 1712775, at *4 (T.C. June 14, 2007) (same); Stockwell v. Comm’r, No. 21954-05, 2007 WL 1702608, at
*3−4 (T.C. June 13, 2007) (same); see also Roberta F. Mann, On the Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives
Transportation Choice, 24 VA. TAX REV. 587, 607 (2005) (“‘Workforce development and transportation
policies are inexorably linked.’” (quoting Angela Glover Blackwell, Promoting Equitable Development, 34
IND. L. REV. 1273, 1279 (2001))).
123 Luo, supra note 120 (noting that white-collar unemployment rose to 4.6% in December 2008, up from
3% in 2007, and that blue collar unemployment rose to 11.3%).
124 See id. (describing a former professional who shoveled snow when he could not find employment
elsewhere).
125 Wilbert, 553 F.3d at 546.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 548–49.
128 See cases cited supra note 122.
129 See Christopher W. Schoen, Note, The Family Savings Account: A Practical Tax Incentive to Stimulate
Personal Savings Rates, 4 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 103, 104 (1990) (“For example, due to general inflation during
the post-war period, many young families can no longer afford a house in major metropolitan areas.”).
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D. The Limited Availability of § 162(a)(2) for Married Taxpayers After
Flowers
After Flowers, a taxpayer who maintains a place of residence in one place
and works in another is prevented from deducting § 162(a)(2) expenses
because the decision to work away from home is characterized as
“personal.”130 The “personal-versus-business” analysis is flawed in two
ways.131 First, the personal-versus-business distinction is the wrong inquiry in
§ 162(a)(2) cases. Section 162(a)(2) allows a taxpayer to deduct what is
otherwise a non-deductible personal expense, such as lodging and meals.132
Such costs should be deductible because Congress created an exception under
§ 162(a)(2) to the general rule that personal, living, and family costs are not
deductible.133 By labeling a decision as “personal,” courts overlook the fact
that a taxpayer who qualifies for § 162(a)(2) can deduct expenses that are
personal, such as lodging and meals.134 Stated another way, after Flowers,
taxpayers are unable to deduct personal expenses under § 162(a)(2) because
the expenses are characterized as personal. Such circular logic undoubtedly
helps courts decide when a taxpayer’s expenses are deductible under
§ 162(a)(2) quickly, but certainly not fairly.135
Secondly, the personal-versus-business distinction is particularly harmful
to married taxpayers because it assumes that a taxpayer has only two
personalities—one business, the other personal.136 While the former is
concerned exclusively with the taxpayer’s profit-seeking motive, the latter

130

See supra Part I.B (discussing the Flowers opinion).
The personal-versus-business distinction has been discussed in other contexts. See Dagan, supra note
102 (arguing that the personal-versus-business distinction is inadequate in the context of commuting
expenses); Marie Louise Fellows, Rocking the Tax Code: A Case Study of Employment-Related Child-Care
Expenditures, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 307 (1998) (examining the personal-versus-business distinction as
applied to child care and suggesting that the anti-subordination principle may prove useful).
132 Jay Katz, The Deductibility of Educational Costs: Why Does Congress Allow the IRS to Take Your
Education So Personally?, 17 VA. TAX REV. 1, 9 (1997) (“Occasionally, the Code and the regulations do allow
a deduction for some personal expenses if they also meet the requirements for a trade or business deduction
under section 162(a).”).
133 See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
135 See Dagan, supra note 102, at 199 (“The seemingly technical business–personal distinction does not
encompass the full range (and the nuances) of the normative considerations involved, and hence, needs to be
substituted by more subtle devices.”).
136 See William D. Popkin, The Taxpayer’s Third Personality: Comments on Redlark v. Commissioner,
72 IND. L.J. 41, 44 (1996) (finding that the personal-versus-business distinction is stretched to its limits in
certain contexts such as commuting expenses).
131
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focuses exclusively on the taxpayer’s pleasure-seeking motive.137 Courts
automatically label a taxpayer’s choice to live in one place and work in another
as a decision fueled by the taxpayer’s pleasure-seeking motive because they
assume that a rational taxpayer would live closer to work to avoid incurring
additional expenses.138
Although the distinction has a “mechanically
reassuring surface attraction,” this rigid two-personality approach is
inappropriate in the case of married taxpayers.139 The distinction is based on
the notion of an archetypal single male taxpayer who can always act in his own
best interest.140 However, the married taxpayer is constrained because he
generally seeks the family’s best interest, not just his own.141 Relevant to the
§ 162(a)(2) deduction, a married taxpayer chooses the locale of home and of
work “to maximize utility for the household, not for the individual.”142 Factors
such as a spouse’s occupation or a community that meets the family needs play
an important role in location decisions.143 Courts too quickly label the decision
by married taxpayers to live and work in two different places as a nondeductible “personal” choice, regardless of the circumstances.144

137 See, e.g., United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 48 (1963) (characterizing an expense as business
versus personal depends on the whether the “claim arises in connection with the taxpayer’s profit-seeking
activities” (emphasis added)).
138 See, e.g., Andrews v. Comm’r, 931 F.2d 132, 138 (1st Cir. 1991) (“The guiding policy must be that the
taxpayer is reasonably expected to locate his ‘home,’ for tax purposes, at his ‘major post of duty’ so as to
minimize the amount of business travel away from home that is required; a decision to do otherwise is
motivated not by business necessity but by personal considerations, and should not give rise to greater business
travel deductions.”); see also Ovsak, supra note 23, at 440 (“The [principal place of business rule] assumes
that an employee will locate the employee’s residence as close as possible to his or her workplace.”).
139 See Ovsak, supra note 23, at 440 (“That assumption [that an employee can live close to work]
becomes complicated, however, when the employee cannot locate his or her residence near the workplace,
such as where the employee’s work-site is physically situated or restricted in such a way that the employee is
literally precluded from living in close proximity to the work-site.”); Popkin, supra note 136, at 43–45
(arguing that taxpayers have a third personality concerned with group redistribution of wealth).
140 See Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Market Efficiency,
and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 653 (1993) (arguing that women can only effectively enter the work
force when they begin to act like men).
141 Li Li Swain & Steven Garasky, Migration Decisions of Dual-earner Families: An Application of
Multilevel Modeling, 28 J. FAM. ECON. ISSUES 151, 167 (2007) (concluding that “a family’s decision to move
is affected by many economic and non-economic factors”).
142 Lueck & Hofmeister, supra note 103, at 4.
143 See John T. Schuring, Detroit’s Renaissance Zones: The Economics of Tax Incentives in Metropolitan
Location Decisions, the Results of the Zones to Date, and Thoughts on the Future, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
329, 349 (2006) (stating that a taxpayer’s choice of location includes non-economic factors such as “the
quality of educational opportunities, crime, access to cultural resources, and overall municipal services”).
144 See Lynch, supra note 15, at 777 (“This evolution [of § 162(a)(2) case law] has entailed a rigid
presumption that when spouses work in two places they do so as a matter of personal choice, whatever the
facts may be.”).
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E. The § 162(a)(2) Marriage Penalty Should Be Rejected Because Married
Taxpayers Are the Intended Beneficiaries of § 162(a)(2)
Congress provided the § 162(a)(2) deduction to ease the burden of the
taxpayer who must travel for work and to encourage taxpayers to do
business.145 A taxpayer who travels for business is burdened because he
maintains his place of residence where he incurs one set of non-deductible
living expenses and works at another place where he incurs substantial and
duplicative living expenses.146 A married taxpayer, in particular, would appear
to benefit from the deduction because he is more likely to maintain a place of
residence where he incurs substantial, continuous, and duplicative living
expenses while traveling.147 Indeed, § 162(a)(2) provided significant relief to a
married taxpayer prior to the emergence of the marriage penalty.148 In creating
the § 162(a)(2) marriage penalty,149 courts have overlooked the fact that the
provision exists as a “measure of justice” for the taxpayer who travels for

145

See, e.g., Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 478 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“The only stated
purpose, and it is clearly stated, not in words of art, is to relieve the tax burden when one is away from home
on business.”); Schurer v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 544, 546 (1944) (noting that § 162(a)(2) will help commercial
travelers).
146 E.g., In re Bechtelheimer, 239 B.R. 616, 621 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999); see also Brown v. Comm’r, 13
B.T.A. 832, 834 (1928) (“Congress undoubtedly intended that the taxpayer’s personal expenditures in
maintaining his usual place of abode should not be deducted, but that all expenditures made by the taxpayer in
addition to those amounts if incurred in carrying on a trade or business should be deducted in determining net
income.”); supra note 11 and accompanying text.
147 See Van Riper, supra note 96 (“Newly married couples also tend to purchase a house or condo within
a couple of years. This allows them to accrue equity—a positive thing—but also forces them to incur big
expenses, like household maintenance, homeowners and life insurance, and furniture.”).
148 Compare Wallace v. Comm’r, 144 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1944) (wife who maintained marital
residence in San Francisco obtained deduction for expenses incurred while working in Los Angeles), and
Stairwalt v. Comm’r, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 902 (1952) (wife who maintained marital residence in New York City
and worked in Wilmington, Delaware obtained deduction), with Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473 (1946)
(taxpayer who maintained personal residence in Jackson, Mississippi, and worked in Mobile, Alabama, was
denied deduction because expenses were “incurred solely as the result of the taxpayer’s desire to maintain a
home in Jackson while working in Mobile”). Compare Schurer, 3 T.C. at 546–7 (husband who maintained
marital residence in Pittsburgh and worked temporarily in different cities obtained deduction), and Dennett v.
Comm’r, 7 B.T.A. 1173, 1173–75 (1927) (wife who maintained marital residence in Washington, D.C. and
worked temporarily in Seattle obtained deduction), with Hantzis v. Comm’r, 638 F.2d 248, 255 (1st Cir. 1981)
(wife who maintained marital residence in Boston and worked one summer in New York City was denied
deduction because she had “no business ties to Boston that would bring her within the temporary employment
doctrine”).
149 See, e.g., York v. Comm’r, 160 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (disallowing deduction for taxpayer who
relocated and moved his family as soon as possible); Hammond v. Comm’r, 20 T.C. 285, 287−88 (1953)
(disallowing deduction where both spouses worked in different cities); Johnson v. Comm’r, 8 T.C. 303,
308−09 (1947) (disallowing deduction for taxpayer who was promised by his employer that he would be able
to return home the following year).
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business so that he will not be taxed on costs he incurs to produce his
income.150 In light of the high costs associated with marriage,151 it is
particularly egregious when married couples are unable to obtain the benefit of
§ 162(a)(2). While a single taxpayer often saves nearly five percent of his pay,
married taxpayers often spend all of their monthly income on living
expenses.152 Because of the § 162(a)(2) marriage penalty, married taxpayers
continue to incur duplicative living expenses while traveling away from their
place of residence, but they are unable to obtain a much-needed and muchdeserved deduction.
III. THE PRIMARY VICTIMS OF THE § 162(A)(2) MARRIAGE PENALTY
Federal taxation is a “self-executing, nation-wide delivery system for
behavioral change.”153 Policy makers routinely use taxes to encourage
taxpayers to engage in certain “socially desirable” activities—such as
deductions for charitable contributions and exemptions for earnings on
personal savings.154 On the state level, legislatures frequently levy taxes to
discourage taxpayers from purchasing “socially proscribed” goods and
services, such as alcohol, tobacco, and, most recently, sugared beverages.155
The imposition of these taxes likely has the desired effect of altering the
behavior of taxpayers—that is, the taxpayer will make more charitable
contributions or purchase less alcohol.156 However, sometimes the real effect
of a tax is clear only in its application, when certain unexpected consequences
emerge. Regardless of their intended effects, taxes inevitably shape behavior,
150

Schurer, 3 T.C. at 546.
See Van Riper, supra note 96 (finding that married couples are more likely to incur substantial
expenses, like household maintenance, property taxes, and homeowners’ insurance, and single taxpayers who
own a home stand to benefit more than married couples because single taxpayers have a lower standard
deduction and can obtain the benefit of itemized deductions like mortgage interest and property taxes). “Once
children enter the picture, married couples are really in financial trouble: The costs to raise and educate
children are staggering.” Id. Married couples with children can spend three times more on monthly living
costs than what the childless couple spends. Id.
152 Id.; cf. RICHARD FRY & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, WOMEN, MEN AND THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE 1 (2010) (discussing the economic benefits of marriage).
153 Mann, supra note 122, at 589–90.
154 E.g., Schoen, supra note 129, at 106.
155 E.g., Anemona Hartocollis, City’s Health Commissioner, in a Medical Journal Article, Calls for a Tax
on Soda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, at A22 (citing Kelly D. Brownell et al., The Public Health and Economic
Benefits of Taxing Sugar-Sweetened Beverages, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1599 (2009)).
156 R. Elder et al., The Effectiveness of Tax Policy Interventions for Reducing Excessive Alcohol
Consumption and Related Harms, 38 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 217, 217 (2010) (concluding that there is
“strong evidence that raising alcohol excise taxes is an effective strategy for reducing excessive
alcohol consumption and related harms”).
151
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and their power to impact the character of everyday life cannot be
overlooked.157 It would be a dangerous mistake to blindly apply § 162(a)(2)
because “deductions invoke the fundamental issues of tax policy.”158
However, the courts and the IRS have repeatedly made this very mistake by
restricting the availability of § 162(a)(2) without considering the implications
of their decisions.159 As a result, certain unintended and undesirable
consequences have emerged and the two primary victims are dual wage earners
and female taxpayers.160
A. Courts’ Denials of § 162(a)(2) Deductions Creates an Untenable Catch-22
For Dual Wage Earners
For dual wage earners, relocating the family is not just a matter of
inconvenience; rather, one spouse may be required to quit his or her job,
potentially causing the family a significant loss of income.161 Recall the
married couple in Hantzis, where the husband continued to work in Boston, the
couple’s place of residence, while his wife, unable to find work in Boston,
worked in New York for one summer.162 Despite her permanent return to
Boston immediately thereafter, the court determined that the wife’s principal
place of business was in New York and denied the § 162(a)(2) deduction on
this basis.163 The court treated her choice not to relocate to New York as
purely personal and disregarded the husband’s employment position in
Boston,164 thereby encouraging married taxpayers to behave in a way that is
unrealistic, inappropriate, and undesirable.
Although the § 162(a)(2) marriage penalty unfairly denies the deduction to
single-earner couples, these taxpayers at the very least are able to avoid the

157 See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 16, at 988–1035 (providing “a positive description of the adverse
effects on work and family structure generated by current tax law”).
158 Dagan, supra note 102, at 244.
159 See, e.g., Mann, supra note 122, at 590 (“The federal tax system influences urban transportation
choices by failing to account for negative externality costs, and in some instances, actually subsidizing choices
that result in significant environmental and social cost.”); McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1059 (arguing that the
interaction of “tax law and real-world conditions pushes towards a traditional, gendered division of labor”).
160 See Lynch, supra note 15, at 772 (noting that in cases where the husband and wife work in different
places but maintain a place of residence together, the court’s denial of the deduction is “[p]erhaps the most
galling and high-handed application” of § 162(a)(2)).
161 See id.
162 Hantzis v. Comm’r, 638 F.2d 248, 249 (1st Cir. 1981).
163 Id. at 255−56.
164 See id. at 257 (“Her expenses associated with maintaining her New York residence arose from
personal interests that led her to maintain two residences rather than a single residence close to her work.”).
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costs of maintaining two homes.165 Dual wage earners, however, face an
untenable choice: both spouses can keep their jobs but continue to incur
additional travel and duplicative living expenses, or one spouse can quit his or
her job and the couple can relocate. By imposing the § 162(a)(2) marriage
penalty, courts encourage a more traditional view of the family—one where
the male is the sole wage earner—despite the fact that “more families have two
earners for the family to achieve an acceptable living standard.”166
B. Female Taxpayers Are The Primary Victims of the § 162(a)(2) Marriage
Penalty
The § 162(a)(2) marriage penalty creates a disincentive for women in
single-earner households to even enter the workforce167 because women are
significantly more likely to be the secondary wage earners in a marriage.168 In
comparison to single women, married women are much more sensitive to tax
cuts and tax raises—cut their tax rates, they get jobs, but raise their taxes, they
stay home.169 A married woman is less likely to work if her potential wages do
not exceed the cost of increased taxes and the costs of childcare services,
housekeeping, and non-deductible work expenses, such as § 162(a)(2)
expenses.170
Even when the wife joins the workforce, the § 162(a)(2) marriage penalty
creates a disincentive for the wife to remain in the workforce. In cases where
the husband travels, a wife may lose her job because the family is more likely
165

See supra Part II.A.
Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income
Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 66 (1993); see also Steven Greenhouse, Back to the Grind, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2009, at B1 (arguing that the recession is driving highly-educated women who had left work to stay
at home with their children to return to the workplace).
167 See McCaffery, supra note 16, at 994 (“[M]arried women are at the margins of the workforce—in
terms of wages, power, and costs—and the tax laws contribute to this marginalization by putting the wife’s
income at the margins of the family’s.”).
168 See, e.g., id. (“Men are more than five times more likely to be the single earner in single-earner
households.”). However, married women are increasingly earning the title of the primary bread winner. See,
e.g., FRY & COHN, supra note 152, at 2 (“[O]nly 4% of husbands had wives who brought home more income
than they did in 1970, a share that rose to 22% in 2007 . . . .”).
169 See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A
DATABOOK 1 (2009) [hereinafter DATABOOK] (“Unmarried mothers have higher participation rates [in the
labor force] than married mothers. In 2008, 76 percent of unmarried mothers were in the labor force,
compared with 69 percent of married mothers.”); Virginia Postrel, The U.S. Tax System Is Discouraging
Married Women from Working, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2000, at C2 (arguing that the relationship between taxes
and labor-force participation is strongest for married women).
170 Davis, supra note 16, at 210.
166
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to relocate to the husband’s principal place of business to avoid duplicative
living expenses.171 Even if the family does not relocate, the additional costs of
the husband’s travel may nevertheless outweigh the value of the wife’s income
and she may be encouraged to quit her job.172 On the other hand, even if the
wife travels, the family is less likely to relocate to her place of business
because her gains from opportunities rarely outweigh her husband’s losses
from moving.173 And if the family does not relocate, she may have to quit her
job because the Hantzis and Flowers decisions prohibit her from receiving any
deduction under § 162(a)(2).174 Lastly, a working wife is less likely to meet
the overnight requirement in Correll than her working husband. To fulfill her
household duties, she is more likely to travel long distances during the day and
return to her personal residence at night,175 and consequently not qualify for
the deduction. 176
In sum, the § 162(a)(2) marriage penalty creates a disincentive for women
to enter into and remain in the work force, thereby encouraging a more
traditional view of the family where the husband is the single wage earner and
the wife remains at home.177 Permitting the tax code to encourage this
traditional view of the family is not appropriate because married women have
become a significant part of the workforce, driven by both personal and
economic reasons.178 Moreover, an increasing number of women are selfemployed179 and would therefore benefit directly from the deduction if not for
171

See William T. Bielby & Denise D. Bielby, I Will Follow Him: Family Ties, Gender-Role Beliefs, and
Reluctance to Relocate for a Better Job, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1241, 1243 (1992) (“[T]he labor market is structured
such that husbands’ gains from opportunities elsewhere tend to exceed wives’ losses from moving, so tied
movers are disproportionately female.”).
172 See Davis, supra note 16, at 210 (“A taxpayer will enter the labor force only if it is to his or her
economic advantage.”).
173 See Bielby & Bielby, supra note 171, at 1243.
174 See supra Part II.C–D.
175 See Carol J. Gaumer et al., Enhancing Organizational Competitiveness: Causes and Effects of Stress
on Women, 21 J. WORKPLACE BEHAV. HEALTH 31, 33 (2005) (noting that women assume seventy percent of
all household responsibilities).
176 See supra Part II.B.
177 See McCaffery, supra note 16, at 1059 (arguing that interaction of “tax law and real-world conditions
pushes towards a traditional, gendered division of labor”).
178 See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS: EMPLOYMENT
CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES IN 2008, at 2, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/famee_
05272009.pdf (concluding that in 2008, the husband and wife were both employed in 51.4% of married-couple
families and in 62.1% of married-couple families with children); Greenhouse, supra note 166 (arguing that the
recession is driving highly-educated women who had left work to stay at home with their children to return to
the workplace); McCaffery, supra note 140, at 601 (“[A] massive number of women, especially married
women, have entered the paid labor force.”).
179 DATABOOK, supra note 169, at 3.
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the § 162(a)(2) marriage penalty. Women already face substantial hurdles in
entering and remaining in the work force, making the § 162(a)(2) marriage
penalty even more unacceptable. The wage gap—which still exists for married
women and is detrimental to their ability to further their careers—is one such
hurdle.180 Another obstacle is the “marriage penalty” that exists in the
progressive tax structure, making a married woman’s entry into the workforce
more expensive.181 Additionally, the Earned Income Tax Credit creates its
own “marriage penalty” that encourages more single-earner families than dual
wage earners.182 Lastly, the failure to tax imputed income also contributes to a
bias against labor-force participation by secondary earners.183 In light of
married women’s economic and social circumstances, the § 162(a)(2) marriage
penalty is egregious.
IV. THE REMEDY
[T]o judicially innovate a meaning of “home” as the taxpayer’s
“place of business . . . ,” would, we think, operate to thwart the
184
obvious purpose of Congress to tax net income.

This Comment illustrates the existence of the § 162(a)(2) marriage penalty
and demonstrates the need for reform. In this Part, this Comment proposes a
statutory adoption of a special provision for married couples, whereby “home”
is defined as a taxpayer’s “place of residence.” A constitutional challenge
based on the application of § 162(a)(2) will likely fail because the Supreme
Court has rejected similar challenges to other tax provisions.185 Federal
legislation is therefore a more appropriate vehicle for change than the Supreme
Court because, where notions of fairness and equity are implicated, the Court

180

See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 140, at 600 (“Almost all of the existing wage gap is between married
men and ever-married women; remove them from the analysis, and women and men receive virtually equal
pay.”).
181 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
182 See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 16, at 995.
183 See e.g., id. at 1002–03 (“Virtually all of the services that the spouse who stays at home performs
constitute untaxed imputed income. . . . By performing these services herself, the wife obtains a tax benefit for
the family: it is precisely as though she were receiving a discount of her marginal tax rate.”).
184 Wallace v. Comm’r, 144 F.2d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 1944) (emphasis in original).
185 See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 451 (1991) (“Inherent in the power to tax is the power to
discriminate in taxation.”); Leo P. Martinez, The Trouble with Taxes: Fairness, Tax Policy, and the
Constitution, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 413, 427–28 (2004) (commenting that in the area of taxation, “[t]he
Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the dormant Commerce Clause, and other
constitutional doctrines have had minimal effect”).
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traditionally has “toss[ed] the ball back to Congress for further play.”186 This
section argues that the place of residence definition is the appropriate solution
for the following reasons: (1) it reduces the § 162(a)(2) marriage penalty while
retaining certain limits on the deduction; (2) Congress has defined “home” as
place of residence for other groups of taxpayers based on their unique
characteristics; and (3) Congress has a strong interest in supporting both
families and working women.187
A. The Adoption of “Home” as Place of Residence Will Significantly
Decrease the Magnitude of the § 162(a)(2) Marriage Penalty
Under the place of residence definition—instead of the principal place of
business rule—married couples will not be sanctioned by courts for refusing to
relocate their families each time a new job opportunity arises.188 Instead, a
married taxpayer will be able to deduct expenses under § 162(a)(2) while
traveling away from his personal residence for business purposes. The
personal-versus-business distinction will not punish a decision not to relocate
that is made in the best interest of the family.189 By defining “home” in its
ordinary way, Congress can avoid inequitable outcomes like Hantzis and
Wilbert, which relied on unrealistic expectations of a taxpayer’s ability to
relocate for a new or temporary job.190 Under the proposed statutory change, a
dual-earner couple would not have to decide which spouse’s income is more
important because both husband and wife could maintain their occupations.191
Married women also stand to benefit from the change because the potential for
§ 162(a)(2) gender bias is reduced.192 Thus, under the place of residence
definition, a married woman would not be as likely to have to follow her
186 Martinez, supra note 185, at 445−46 (arguing further that “the Supreme Court has been reluctant to
incorporate the notion of fairness in its review of taxation”); see also Katz, supra note 132, at 91−92 (arguing
that although education expenses are treated unfairly under the Tax Code, courts have “consistently upheld the
validity of these regulations, making it unlikely that any court will declare them void”).
187 Cf. Gerhardt, supra note 9, at 4 (arguing that defining “home” as “place of residence” is inconsistent
with the goals of the statute).
188 See supra Part II.A (arguing that the adoption of the principal-place-of-business rule is particularly
harmful to married taxpayers who are not able to relocate).
189 See supra Part II.D (demonstrating that Flowers substantially limited the availability of § 162(a)(2) for
married taxpayers by focusing on an inappropriate personal-versus-business distinction).
190 See supra Part II.C (discussing why the temporary exception applied by the courts is based on
assumptions that are unrealistic for families in today’s economy).
191 See supra Part III.A (explaining why the courts’ denials of § 162(a)(2) for dual wage earners is
particularly unjust because it creates an untenable catch-22).
192 See supra Part II.B (arguing that female taxpayers are the primary victims of the § 162(a)(2) marriage
penalty).
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husband to his job location, even where he is the primary wage earner.
Moreover, this solution remains true to the words of the statute and to
Congress’s stated desire to alleviate the burden on the taxpayer whose business
requires travel.193
The proposed change is limited in its potential for abuse because married
taxpayers still are subject to both the temporary and the overnight
requirements.194 Although not every married taxpayer will obtain the
deduction, the proposed change will help to significantly decrease the existing
marriage penalty.195 This resolution represents a compromise between married
taxpayers who deserve the deduction and the IRS and courts who want to limit
the availability of a deduction of otherwise non-deductible expenses.
Additionally, Congress generally prefers “piecemeal and limited changes” to
the Tax Code as opposed to complete statutory overhauls that can cost billions
of dollars in lost revenues.196 The potential for abuse is also limited because
married taxpayers likely will not make a decision to maintain two homes solely
to qualify for the deduction: Taxpayers who receive the deduction will
continue to incur the expenses of maintaining two homes and the more
intangible cost of being separated from one’s spouse and children.
B. Congress Has Adopted the Place of Residence Rule for Other Groups of
Taxpayers
This Comment’s proposal to create a statutory exception for a group of
similarly situated taxpayers is not unprecedented. In the case of a taxpayer
who has no principal place of business, such as a salesperson or a construction
193 See supra Part II.E (arguing that the § 162(a)(2) marriage penalty should be rejected because married
taxpayers are the intended beneficiaries of § 162(a)(2)).
194 One potential concern is that the overnight requirement may be too restrictive for a married women
who tend to undertake more daily commutes. However, the overnight requirement will not be too restrictive
because a married woman generally works close to her place of residence and travels significantly less than her
husband. The husband is more likely travel; however, both taxpayers will benefit from the deduction. See
BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS ANNUAL REPORT 76
(2005), available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/transportation_statistics_annual_report/2005/html/
chapter_02/long_distance_travel_by_women.html (noting that men make almost 8 out of every 10 of longdistance business trips and long distance business travel constitutes 21% of males’ long-distance trips
compared with 9% for females).
195 A review conducted for this Comment examined thirty-three case decisions from 1927 to 2008 in
which married taxpayers were denied the deduction and concluded that married taxpayers would have obtained
the deduction in the majority of these cases (eighteen cases) under the place of residence rule.
196 See Katz, supra note 132, at 91–95 (arguing that educational expenses should be deductible but
complete overhaul of the statute is unlikely because substantial deductions would then be available to
taxpayers).
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worker, courts define “home” as the taxpayer’s place of residence.197 Courts
created this exception because it would be unreasonable to expect a taxpayer
who moves from one job to the next to relocate his place of residence each
time the job location changes.198 To receive the benefit of the exception, the
traveling taxpayer must prove that he incurs substantial, duplicative, and
continuous expenses at place of residence when he is traveling away from that
residence.199 Second, as part of the Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003,
Congress added a new subsection to § 162.200 Under § 162(p), a member of
the armed forces is considered “away from home” under § 162(a)(2) when he
is traveling away from his place of residence in connection with his service.201
Congress reasoned that the principal place of business definition was
inappropriate because of the unique travel demands and financial challenges of
military taxpayers.202 Third, although §162(a) deductions are generally not
available to persons whose jobs require them to travel or relocate for a period
of over one year, Congress carved out an exception for federal employees
participating in federal criminal investigations,203 presumably because such
197 See Leach v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 20, 21 (1949) (allowing deduction for a construction worker who
maintained a place of residence in Florence, Alabama, but traveled forty-nine weeks during the year);
Gustafson v. Comm’r, 3 T.C. 998, 999−1000 (1944), nonacq. in result, I.R.S. Announcement, 1973-2 C.B. 1,
1973 WL 157513 (allowing deduction for a salesman who claimed that his residence was with his married
sister in Greenville, Iowa, and spent fifty-two weeks traveling for business); see also supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
198 See Andrews v. Comm’r, 931 F.2d 132, 137 (1st Cir. 1991) (explaining that, with regard to itinerant
and temporary workers, “[t]he courts and the Commissioner have agreed that a taxpayer cannot be expected to
relocate her primary residence to a place of temporary employment”).
199 E.g., In re Bechtelheimer, 239 B.R. 616, 622 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1999) (citing James v. United States,
308 F.2d 204, 207 (9th Cir. 1962)).
200 Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, 26 U.S.C. §§ 101−140 (2006). The Act also provides
members of the Armed Forces with tax breaks for death benefits, sale of a principal residence, and education
costs. Id. §§ 102, 121, 127.
201 26 U.S.C. § 162(p) (2006). The statute reads as follows:

For purposes of subsection (a)(2), in the case of an individual who performs services as a
member of a reserve component of the Armed Forces of the United States at any time during the
taxable year, such individual shall be deemed to be away from home in the pursuit of a trade or
business for any period during which such individual is away from home in connection with such
service.
Id.
202 149 CONG. REC. H10364-02, H10370 (daily ed. Nov. 5, 2003) (statement of Sen. Cardin) (“[Congress]
should recognize the fact that [military families] have additional expenses that should be treated fairly in our
tax code, and . . . I hope the provisions in this bill are a starting point, not an ending point for dealing with
these tax issues. So we can try to provide some appropriate relief to our military families.”).
203 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2006) provides, in relevant part:

For purposes of paragraph (2) [which allows a taxpayer to deduct traveling expenses incurred
while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business], the taxpayer shall not be treated as
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taxpayers travel constantly for work, and it would be unreasonable to expect
them to relocate each time the primary location of their jobs changed. Lastly,
the Tax Code specifically defines “home” for members of Congress as place of
residence because such taxpayers must reside in their home districts and travel
to Washington, D.C. for a significant portion of their time.204 Arguably,
married couples are as constrained as many of these taxpayers who have been
granted specific exceptions. As in the case of a salesperson or construction
worker, it is unreasonable to require a married taxpayer to “carry his home on
his back regardless of the fact that he maintains his family at an abode which
meets all accepted definitions of ‘home.’”205 Like a member of Congress who
is unable to relocate, a secondary wage earner may be unable to move her
family to where she works because that would require the primary wage earner
to quit his job.206 A non-military married taxpayer may experience financial
difficulties similar to those faced by a military family, as did the husband in
Wilbert who lost his job and then could not afford to move his family each
time he switched temporary jobs.207 However, such strained reasoning is
unnecessary—the existing exceptions are relevant because they demonstrate
the willingness of Congress and the courts to consider the unique
characteristics of a group of taxpayers when § 162(a)(2) is being interpreted
unreasonably. The adoption of “home” as place of residence is equally
appropriate for married taxpayers because it is more equitable and reasonable
in light of the unique characteristics of their demographic.208

being temporarily away from home during any period of employment if such period exceeds 1
year. The preceding sentence shall not apply to any Federal employee during any period for
which such employee is certified by the Attorney General (or the designee thereof) as traveling
on behalf of the United States in temporary duty status to investigate or prosecute, or provide
support services for the investigation or prosecution of, a Federal crime.
204

26 U.S.C. § 162(a) also provides:
For purposes of the preceding sentence [which allows a taxpayer to deduct traveling expenses
incurred while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business], the place of residence of a
Member of Congress (including any Delegate and Resident Commissioner) within the State,
congressional district, or possession which he represents in Congress shall be considered his
home, but amounts expended by such Members within each taxable year for living expenses shall
not be deductible for income tax purposes in excess of $3,000.

205

Peurifoy v. Comm’r, 358 U.S. 59, 62 (1958) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See Hantzis v. Comm’r, 638 F.2d 248, 249 (1st Cir. 1981) (denying taxpayer deduction for travel
expenses that she incurred while working in New York for ten weeks on the grounds that her husband, the
primary wage earner, was located in Boston).
207 See supra notes 120–29 and accompanying text.
208 See supra Part II.A–D (arguing that courts and the IRS have created a § 162(a)(2) marriage penalty
because a married taxpayer is more likely to be constrained in decision making).
206
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C. The Adoption of “Home” as Place of Residence Comports with Congress’s
Interest in Promoting Working Families and Encouraging Women to Work
Congress has demonstrated its interest in promoting working families and
encouraging women to work by frequently enacting laws to benefit these two
groups. For example, under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Congress protected
female employees by abolishing wage discrimination based on sex.209 Under
the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Congress protected working
families by allowing a qualified employee to take job-protected leave, in part
“to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to
promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote
national interests in preserving family integrity.”210 In its findings, Congress
recognized that the number of families in which both parents work has
increased significantly, and “due to the nature of the roles of men and women
in our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on
women, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than
it affects the working lives of men.”211 Most recently, Congress passed the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which includes three
personal tax measures aimed at supporting working families: (1) The “Making
Work Pay” Tax Credit reduces taxes for working families; (2) an increase in
the Earned Income Tax Credit reduces the “EITC marriage penalty;” and (3)
an increase in the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit helps taxpayers with
child care expenses.212
Under the place of residence definition, married taxpayers would save costs
and avoid relocating their families each time a new job opportunity arose.
Married women would also benefit from the change because the potential for
the § 162(a)(2) gender bias would be reduced. Congress can continue to
support working families by adopting place of residence as “home.”
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CONCLUSION
The failure of the Supreme Court to clarify when a taxpayer is considered
“away from home” for purposes of § 162(a)(2) has resulted in a marriage
penalty that prevents married taxpayers from receiving an earned deduction.
While “[i]t is tempting to conclude that fairness is not relevant to
taxation[,] . . . this would contradict the wide acceptance [that] fairness has
correctly received in the formulation of tax policy.” 213 The marriage penalty
created by increasingly narrow interpretations of § 162(a)(2) and the resulting
gender bias are unacceptable. Congress legislated in 1921 to relieve the
burden on the traveling taxpayer, and Congress must now clarify the statute to
provide relief for the intended beneficiaries of the deduction.
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